Foucalt's Paradox: From Inversionary Discourse to Hegemonic Power in "Mao's Republic" by Apter, David E.
Foucault's Paradox: From Inversionary 
Discourse to Hegemonic Power in 
"Mao's Republic" 
DAVID E. APTER 
The Redemptive Fallacy 
"Who now reads Foucault"? For that matter who now reads Marx, 
Sartre, Levi-Strauss, deconstructivists and even the "post" post- 
modernists? Analytical worlds change intellectual couturiers almost 
as quickly as the world of fashion changes designers (despite, or 
perhaps because of the lockjaw language towards which they in- 
cline). Similarly with powerful political leaders. Suddenly, no matter 
how much power they exercised, their world becomes quaint. How 
difficult it is to recuperate the significance of a Lenin or a Mao Ze- 
dong both of whom literally defined the terms of politics and who 
today seem entirely unreal, cardboard figures in the large display of 
history, their moral moments irretrievable. 
To many today we are, instead, at the end of history, of ideology. 
These have been killed by a market whose universal rationality de- 
fines the terms of a distributional equity. So much for the moral Auf- 
heben, the logic of the revolutionary disjunction, the last becoming 
first. Gone is a certain certainty about the future especially of the 
kind in which knowledge is not just knowledge and power is not 
just power and both derive meaning from their emancipatory ob- 
jects. 
It is in terms of political meanings rather than distributional allo- 
cations that we need to see these two figures, Foucault and Mao Ze- 
dong. Each in his one way marks the end of an era. For theirs' was a 
world in which politics could never be just politics, neither for Fou- 
cault, the activist-scholar, nor Mao, the archetype of the revolu- 
tionary cosmocrat. Both believed in a politics of the moral moment, 
the radical disjunctive transformation. Today the Foucault "myth" 
6 The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 10 * 95 
I 
I Foucault's Paradox 
I 
I has been exploded leaving behind a sense that he got what he de- 
served - a tragedy yes, but of his own making. So too, whatever was 
I left of the Mao mystique was finished off in Tiananmen Square in 
June 1989. 
I But why the comparison? Whatever else one can say about Mao he 
I had a huge impact on history. No one would ever claim that for Fou- 
cault. Their connection becomes relevant only in this one respect. 
They were among the last significant inversionaries - believers in the 
I 
I necessity of permanent revolution. 
I Of course, this judgement may be a bit premature. The Marxist 
corpus gets periodically revived. So does critical and radical dis- 
junctive theory. So much does each generation recuperate those the 
previous one has consigned to the dustbin that one can speak of a 
"myth of the eternal return" in social analysis, as well as in politics. If 
so, might it not be the case that despite the current wave of disillu- 
sion with totalizing solutions, the idea of an inversionary solution 
embodied in a surrogate role or class, or other agent as alter, (thief, 
transvestite, if not proletarian or peasant), will come back, and if not 
in political then religious or fundamentalist guise? Indeed, who 
among the "modernists" would have expected the revival of all those 
"parochialisms" which seemed to characterize 19th century politics 
more than 20th. And who can predict what pariah caste or class or 
agent will be chosen next to save us from ourselves. What is interest- 
ing about Foucault and Mao is that in their differing ways they rep- 
resent punctuation marks, the one in intellectual history, the other in 
history itself. Both sought the critical "break" in the seamless web of 
a normalcy they regarded as hegemonic. For Mao the method was 
dialectical, the identification of contradictions, manifested as crises 
and expressed in class conflict. For Foucault it was Hegel's master 
and slave all over again, in the form of the state and its victims. 
Both were obsessed by "les vulnerables", the negatived class or 
other who were then credited with the uniquely transformative 
power of revelatory insight, a higher knowledge than that possessed 
by civil society and the state as constituted. Indeed, from Bakunin to 
Marx to Mao this transformative vision, embodied in the wisdom of 
a revolutionary class, lumpens for the first, proletarians for the sec- 
ond, and peasants for the third and been transmitted as an inheri- 
tance from one radical generation, to more or less come to an end in 
the present. Yet in each case it was the claim, rather than the belief 
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itself, which was important. For their truth claims were much more 
significant as history than the truth value of their ideas. 
Foucault emphasized less the monopoly of coercive power by the 
state in its more conventional sense than the coercive impact of the 
professionalization of knowledge. Bureaucratized, institutionalized, 
and distributed through the structures of civil society, the result was 
a kind of authority to which he was simply allergic. For him, the 
state as an embodiment of knowledge was punitive, hegemonic, and 
morally reprehensible. But for a good part of his life he too believed 
in the redeeming power of those marginalized by science and knowl- 
edge, the criminology that authorizes prisons and validates the se- 
questering of the transgressor of the law, the medicine that defines 
the sick, the psychiatry of the mentally deranged.' 
Such views have a long pedigree. It includes early and late radical 
evangelical Christianity, anarchism, Hegelianism, early and late 
Marxism and many other permutations up to and including Mao 
and Foucault. Its underlying problem is less the critique than the 
solution. Civil societies and states do retain the unfortunate habit of 
condemning those deemed too "different". Indeed, the state takes the 
position of ego to "alters" and is not at all likely to take kindly to any 
role or group which represents itself, by virtue of being "last" as 
candidate for becoming "first" especially when the claim is made that 
only in the more general emancipation is there profit of a1L2 So, if 
Foucault is dead, (and Marx and Mao), and his (and their) books 
ready for the embalming, their paradoxes go marching on. People 
may stop accepting any particular version of what will be called here 
the redemptive fallacy but this will not stop them from inventing 
new forms. Among the sometimes consequences of this belief in the 
redemptive fallacy is political violence. And it is here that Foucault 
parts company with Mao. For with Foucault the theme is sacrifice. 
The sacrifice of the inverted other has consequence in the moral fine 
tuning of society. For a Mao, as with Marx, what counts is class/civil 
war, i.e. the revolutionary disjunctive break. 
Despite these differences, and they are fundamental, the continu- 
ity between a Foucault and a Mao is this. For both there is a negative 
pole to be transcended and an overcoming project to be defined. 
Their common point of departure is those most penalized and vul- 
nerable who, because of their condition, are able to refract and reveal 
the hegemony of the productive classes. But in the end both came to 
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question whether such refractory and revelatory power would in 
any way redress the condition of state power. For no group or class 
could gain a more secure lock on a more equitable future, in the end 
there would only be permanent struggle, permanent revolution. It is 
here where Foucault and Mao share common group. Struggle be- 
comes the solution, the thing in itself. 
Foucault's was always the more explicitly moral theory. From 
Marx to Mao the effort was to make history its own moralizer. Such 
moralities that they professed were in any case cast in the form of a 
persuasively dealienating political economy underlying a projective 
historicism. 
Marginality as the Negative Pole 
This suggested that the point of departure for any inversionary the- 
ory can be called its negative pole and that political struggle substi- 
tutes for final outcomes. Millennialism is dead - long live the strug- 
gle to achieve it. Those clustered at that pole, whether roles or 
classes, and share a common condition of marginality will be the 
ones engaged in permanent struggle, and the participants will 
change while the phenomenon remains the same. So for a Mao, the 
ground zero for his inversionary discourse was the marginalization 
of the peasantry through the loss of its patrimony to landlords, and 
the marginalization of the country due to imperialism, the two being 
part of the same process. Out of this "history" he produced narratives 
of loss and projections of redemptive gain, the displaced condition 
leading to the overcoming project. In the end it was that project 
which failed him. 
What is perhaps more significant about both Foucault and Mao is 
not that the marginalized represent those separated from the rest of 
society but that the separation is contained within the categories of 
the dominant discourse. While the Marxist tradition represents them 
in class surrogate terms (as with Marx's proletariat or Mao's peas- 
ants), the same reasoning can be extended to other categorical 
groups, racially, ethnically, religiously, or linguistically defined. 
And, to use the terms of reference of Sartre and Foucault, negativ- 
ized roles, (thief, murderer, madman, homosexual). 
Their importance is not their marginality per se, but the position 
they are awarded in politics, i.e, as markers of the permissible outer 
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social and cognitive boundaries of state and society. That is, mar- 
ginality represents the farthest social distance from the center in 
moral, economic, and racial, ethnic and other terms. 
Marginality thus is a status condition converted into an interpre- 
tive one. Around it are erected symbolic boundaries difficult to tran- 
scend or permeate. Castelike, a form of pariahdom, they are assigned 
a place by the dominant discourse which, in political terms, can be 
described as invisible. So what are in part symbolic boundaries be- 
come reinforced by physical ones, lines drawn in space, neighbor- 
hood, ghetto, and in the extreme case, the prison and the asylum. 
Reading Foucault and Mao, two main types of marginality 
emerge. For Mao the most important is functional. Functional mar- 
ginality is determined by the value of the contribution made to the 
social product. For Mao, and Marxists generally, this is made by a 
class, but it can extend to any group, role, or individual. In these 
terms rejected in Marx but not in Mao (who was closer to the anar- 
chists in taking this position), are those who make negative contri- 
butions, "lumpens" who take out more than they put in, and under 
conditions described by Arendt as "abject poverty" of a kind leading 
to "acute misery" in which the "absolute dictate of their bodies" gen- 
erates a logic of necessity. In our terms such marginality can be 
called functional superfluousness. 
The other, which one finds in Foucault, might be called discourse 
It takes the form of prejudice, manifested in discrimina- 
tion measured in that social distancing on  which hierarchy as the em- 
bodiment of the dominant discourse, itselfdepends. It may take very ex- 
plicit forms, as with whites and blacks in the U.S. or South Africa, 
Nazism and the Jews. It may be discursively disguised by professed 
principles of the dominant disc~urse.~ 
Functional and discourse marginality tend to go together. It is the 
functionally superfluous who become the pariahs and outcasts of 
society. For Mao, the marginalization of the peasants coincides with 
the marginalization of China, its decentering, bringing down on it 
(among other things) "Yellow Peril" racism (most explicitly on the 
part of the United States and France) and on the part of the Japanese, 
more ambiguously to be sure, cultural and "racial" contempt. 
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Inversionary Discourse Theory 
Seen in this light, marginality is first a structural condition and sec- 
ond an interpretative opportunity. The inversionary task is to trans- 
form marginality into functionality by altering the discourse itself. 
Indeed, what makes Mao interesting for our purposes is his recog- 
nition that it was the discourse which first had to be changed, and 
under circumstances of violence. But not any violence. The acts of 
violence had to be meaningful in terms of the discourse, i.e. to form 
into a social text. The object was to create a radical discourse com- 
munity and not a political party with a radical ideology. Nothing 
else would do but a totalized framework for interpretive action. He 
went from events, to social text, to moral moment. Mao's moral mo- 
ment was Yan'an. It was there that the passive voice became a ~ t i v e . ~  
So much so that Yan'an remains a model type of what can be called 
the redemptive fallacy. 
The moral moment lasted only a short time but it had repercus- 
sions outside of China as well as inside. It affected the so-called soix- 
ante-huitieme generation in ~ r a n c e . ~  (And the crowds of chanting 
students who waved the little red book on university campuses all 
over the world.) It remains today embodied in the doctrinal mega- 
lomania of the Sendero Luminoso in Peru. Mao achieved what Fou- 
cault hoped for and did not, i.e. the generation of a moral moment 
through the power of an inversionary discourse. 
Success or not such events suggest the value of discourse theory as 
a way of interpreting political violence generally and revolution in 
particular.7 It draws attention to how boundaries in the mind seek to 
realize themselves on the ground. For in this sense discourses define 
or redefine jurisdictions, locate "chosen" classes, or categories (the 
political class versus the powerless) and, when inversionary, estab- 
lish a ground zero for an overcomin project directed against society 
and state (Foucault's "carceral city"). F 
Of course the content of such discourses can vary greatly. More 
abstractly they connect a past which is a lesson from history, to a 
future which is learned from the lesson. It takes the form of a projec- 
tive logic - a logic not based directly on events but their narrativized 
form. Or, to put it another way, it locates events which become 
mythic in the telling. Contained in such myths are self defining and 
inscripted parables of loss, and both at individual and collective 
levels. Concretizing loss makes it possible to formulate concrete and 
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programmatic strategies which give immediate substance to the 
larger overcoming project. The result is hermetic and circular. 
How do narratives form which give rise to logic and theory? By 
what techniques is it possible to make the conversion from myth to 
logic and back again? How are confrontational events of the past 
made compelling as part of the present? What stories are selected to 
that events can be "read as social texts? How do social texts become 
real ones, to be used for instruction? Narration gives events struc- 
ture. Texts give the structure logic. Together, with millennia1 out- 
comes they establish higher truths - a teleology. They make revolu- 
tionary transcendence not outrageous but reasonable. 
The term discourse then refers to the totality of discursive prac- 
tices shared by members of the movement as a col le~t ivi t~.~ More 
generally, as outlined above, the logic and the myth contains two 
component dimensions. One is structural, revealing the semiotic or 
signifying aspects of political discourse.1° This includes codes, rituals 
and other symbolic endowments." These, a context of self righteous 
anger, gives discourse its power.'2 A second is phenomenological, in 
Ricoeurian terms - a phenomenology of overcoming. Both aspects 
are extremely well illustrated in Yan'an. There one found a double 
overcoming. Self overcoming its negative circumstances. Collectivity 
transforming the conditions of marginality. Combined in retrievals 
and projections, individuals came to see themselves as the chosen 
instruments for a disjunctive and overturning process. 
We can see this in terms of Yan'an which embodied its own 
"retrievals". These contained echoes of the Jacobin phase of the 
French revolution, the Communes of 1848 and 1870, the Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia. Yan'an thus expropriated a whole revolution- 
ary repertoire and iconography as well as an evolutionary logic of 
the texts.13 
The mimetic rogenitor was the Russian revolution and particu- 
1Y larly Leninism. For Lenin by providing the master narrative of the 
revolution became the first true radical revolutionary cosmocrat. He 
succeeded in endowing virtually every act with a larger significance. 
He appeared, moreover, to elevate a politics of class interest 
(economism) into a politics of principle (the dialectic), which, con- 
veniently enough permitted all matter of practical and instrumental 
actions to be justified. Confrontation could give way to cooperation 
(the United Front), cleavages exploited and coalitions eschewed de- 
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pending not only on the appearance of circumstance but the logic of 
situation. 
With such a logic principle is elevated over interests. Conflict ap- 
pears as the inevitable result of larger material contradictions deriv- 
ing from social and economic processes. The same logic could be 
applied to all the arenas of political action. Of course circumstances 
are constantly changing. The grounding of violence shifts sometimes 
in more subterranean ways and sometimes more superficially, but 
there is little doubt that as a phenomenon political violence is be- 
coming more rather than less widespread.15 
Today's emphasis is less on the kind of revolutionary violence rep- 
resented in Yan'an, (and which has undergirded much of the politi- 
cal violence of this century) and more on ethnic, religious, linguistic, 
racial, and other forms. In this respect ideological millennialism has 
declined in favor of more primordial affiliations.16 Instead of a class 
with radical chains one now finds a marginalized and negativized 
ethnicity, forms of "neo-tribalism", religious fundamentalism, etc., 
but these also involve discourse and each of these movements form 
into discourse communities.17 These, the moral properties of the sac- 
rally endowed, as with the Hezbollah in Lebanon or other funda- 
mentalist and revivalism groups have their own sources of mobiliz- 
able power.18 SO, for all the differences such shifts may represent, 
there is considerable common ground between the primordial and 
the more ideologically formed movements like Baader-Meinhof, Red 
Brigades, or the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. All represent different ex- 
pressions of discourse comm~nities.'~ In short one can apply dis- 
course theory of the sort we have in mind in all those circumstances 
where the inversionary fallacy prevails. This suggests that Yan'an 
continues to offer abundant materials of relevance to more contem- 
porary events. 
One question which discourse theory poses is whether or not 
those most involved in its invention believe in the truths they claim 
to articulate. Does Guzman, the self proclaimed Maoist leader of 
Sendero Luminoso (now languishing in jail), really believe what he 
has declaimed, i.e. that the inversionary discourse he has developed 
will incorporate the world revolutionary mission that has been abdi- 
cated by all other communist parties and erstwhile communist 
countries? On the face of it it is absurd. Yet his followers continue to 
pore over his texts as if they were missals, intoning the logic that 
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supports a structure of mutual confidences and by so doing bolster- 
ing their convictions, their belief in outcomes. This suggests that 
there is something special in the connection between discourse and 
violence when the symbolism of the latter illuminates from within 
the incantory power of the word. 
We want to explore further the connection between this incantory 
pleasure and the violent act. For it goes well beyond the radical 
structuralism which located systemic contradictions in capitalism or 
other political and economic systems. Indeed, from this point of 
view, systemic revolutionary theory becomes the least interesting 
kind, except insofar as it offers to the discourse some sense of under- 
lying truth, and in the form of revealed history converts myths into 
realities. 
Once discourse connects with actual violence, the two reinforce 
one another. The result is not permanent revolution perhaps but en- 
during violence. For in this sense political violence creates its own 
objects, and the discourse so intertwined with it becomes part of its 
power. Objects and principles get separated from the original trig- 
gering events to establish their own momentum. It is then that dis- 
course becomes mobilized, i.e. when events becoming mythically 
and logically orchestrated to provide both an immediate rationale 
and a self establishing boundary; an affiliational requirement, and a 
set of obligations. One might say that once political violence passes a 
certain symbolic threshold and these factors become set, it is virtu- 
ally impossible to put the genie of violence back in the bottle again. 
It creates its forms of power, and out of the subjective intentionalities 
of those who participate in it. This power, collectivizes individual 
experiences, constituting interpretative codes with their own social 
texts which participants read differently from outsiders. 
Which suggests an even more general argument. That political 
violence is a particular way of generating interior meanings which 
form their own discourses constitutive of discourse communities 
which depend on violence for their existence." 
Pedigree Marxism 
We will use the Yan'an case to further illustrate how these categories 
can be used. However, before doing so we want to show how it fits 
14 The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 10 95 
Foucault's Paradox 
within a Marxist and radical revisionist tradition which provided it 
with a usable pedigree that went from Marx to Lenin, to Stalin to 
Mao. In this sense it is necessary to discuss some of the implications 
of an original Marxism before showing Mao's own expropriation of 
them. 
Marxism is, in this sense an originating inversionary discourse 
with putative descendants. It provides the original political language 
for a theory which creates its own myths, its own codes and which 
by endowing historical events with symbolic significance transforms 
them into a social text. 
As suggested, inversionary discourse contains an upending or 
transformational goal aimed at rectifying perceived structural injus- 
tices. Marxism embodies an inversionary discourse incorporating 
both history and logic, and a disjunctive transformational moral 
moment. In Marxism the "contradiction" is between an increasingly 
functionally marginal bourgeoisie holding on to state power in the 
face of a politically marginalized but otherwise functionally signifi- 
cant proletariat, kept at bay by the hegemonic power of the state. 
This hegemony is embodied in the dominant discourse of capitalism 
and the police power which is its surrogate. So an inversionary dis- 
course must be created which "reveals" this contradiction. Realizing 
both the truth of the discourse and the consequences of the contra- 
diction provides for an exchange of meaning along side of the inevi- 
table explosion of the developmental contradiction itself. 
That is the proletariat, as the value creating class, which contrib- 
utes virtually everything to the social product confronts an increas- 
ingly functionally superfluous class, the bourgeoisie. The latter ex- 
propriates all but the subsistence value of that social product. Hence 
the necessity for a disjunctive and transformational break. 
The discourse "works" both as an evolutionary developmental 
narrative, which one might call the myth of historical materialism, 
and a text in which there is embodied the logic of transcendent out- 
comes the two combining to form a highly integrated inversionary 
discourse in which myth and logic, in the form of narrative and text, 
constitute both "evidence" and a logic of necessity.21 
The myth centers around the struggles of an emergent, value pro- 
ducing proletariat. The logic shows why and how it becomes more 
and more functionally significant and both so central to the entire 
system of productive capitalism and so threatening to its relations 
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that it needs to be politically marginalized, which in turn is the cen- 
tral activity of the state. Capitalism as a dominant discourse then 
represents a false consciousness and the fetish of commodities. The 
moral moment of revolutionary change is when mature or late capi- 
talism "splits asunder". The result: a new condition of possibilities 
afforded through the socialization of the means of production and 
the universalization of the proletariat from a functional class to a 
functioning society.22 At this point ends become individualized 
rather than collective. The need for a state largely disappears and 
with it any discourse of domination as well. 
Of course if "one capitalist kills many" one Marxism spawns many 
others, revisionary rather than inversionary in form. One could in- 
clude in this the moralistic anarchism which opposed Marxist politi- 
cal formulations from the start, more moderating alternatives vis B 
vis the revolutionary denouement, (as with Kautsky or Bernstein) or 
still others elevating revolutionary struggle as a thing in itself as in 
Lenin and Mao Zedong, and for whom the purgative aspects of vio- 
lence were essential to the transformational project. What Lenin and 
Mao did was to shift the revolutionary venue to countries without 
large proletarian classes, changing the logic of necessity to a neces- 
sary praxis, thereby providing the communist party with the special 
role as prime agent of historical change, i.e. to produce the 
"inevitable" consequences of a history which had not yet taken place. 
Yan'an as a Revolutionary Simulacrum 
We will now illustrate how this Marxist pedigree was misinterpreted 
and reinterpreted by Mao on his own terms and partly by default as 
well as design. Yan'an was, as has been suggested, the classic case of 
a revolutionary and inversionary discourse community. In its time it 
became a simulacrum, revolutionary in objects, disjunctive in strat- 
egy, and morally displacing in ambition. I will also regard Mao as a 
figure something like Foucault's Great Interpreter, i.e. a cosmocr~tic 
purveyor of an applied logic constructed an inversionary discourse 
of out of the themes of loss, lost individual peasant patrimonies, loss 
of the national patrimony, how chaos came to rule as a result, and 
how both defined the redeeming revolutionary project. I will then 
show how, once it became dominant, the discourse imposed its ex- 
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clusionary boundaries to create a counter-simulacrum in Tiananmen 
Square in the spring of 1989. 
The starting point for Mao's inversionary discourse was a double 
marginalization - peasants as an insurrectionary rather than a revo- 
lutionary class and China as a state, both the consequence of inter- 
ventionist imperialism. In Mao's treatment the peasantry were no 
simple substitute for a proletariat as in classic or even Soviet Marx- 
ism but, as in anarchism, a class of the dispossessed, a class of lum- 
pens, victims of both imperialism and compradore capitalism. Peas- 
ants then were representative of the authentic Chinese as "Neg- 
ativized ~ the r s " . ' ~  They represented the starting point for a train of 
events, a sequence, a history, a narration from which it was possible 
to derive a logic of necessity which gradually hardened into the car- 
pus of Mao Zedong Thought. 
Mao, part Odysseus, part putative Socrates, provided both a 
mythic narration in the form of story telling, along with texts con- 
taining a projective logic. He attributed to imperialism China's 
shame, loss, the "poisoning" of the body politic through the diseases 
of corruption and the afflictions of externally imposed opium, and 
touched the private bitterness, the immolations and agonies so many 
experienced with a logic of transformation, redeeming the diseased 
human body and transforming it into the aermensch - the "good 
~ommunist".'~ He created in Yan'an a discourse community as a 
revolutionary simulacrum. 
This suggests that a good deal more was going on in Yan'an that it 
appeared. It was, of course, a military redoubt. It was also a place 
where the Chinese communists retreated during the Long March, to 
lick their wounds (with sheer survival as their immediate object). It 
was there too that they were able to turn disaster into instruction, 
and instruction into eventual victory. There a rather diverse band 
became totally reorganized into a disciplined force. Followers of 
other communist commanders and military leaders were re- 
educated, and pried loose from their organizations, to be sent else- 
where for service. 
All this under conditions which varied from harsh to catastrophic. 
In December 1937, in Nanjing alone, 300,000 Chinese were killed and 
thousands of women raped, and assaulted. In 1938, two years after 
the Border Region was established, the Japanese occupied Beijing, 
Tianjin, and shortly thereafter, Shanghai and Nanjing, consolidating 
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their control over the cities of northeast China. It was a period in 
which the war was almost lost. By 1940, Yan'an faced virtual starva- 
tion, threatened not only by the Japanese but the superior forces of 
the G M D . ~ ~  
To survive at all meant that a special political chemistry was at 
work in Yan'an. Partly the very destructiveness of the Japanese cam- 
paign increased the determination of young Chinese "joining the 
rev lution" and passing through the dangerous boundaries imposed 
by 7 apanese and Nationalist armies. But once inside, those who 
joined went through an experience closer to a religious conversion 
than anything else. 
Mao was at once story teller and interpreter of logical truth. In the 
first he uses the raw materials of Chinese history for his troping of 
facts. In the second, he draws on the historical pedigree of Marxism, 
through Leninism, and Stalinism, both to validate his own position, 
and to distinguish his contributions to Marxist theory from theirs. 
One ought not forget, as well, that in fact the political situation was 
not only one of revolution and war, but the GMD was the surrogate 
of the United States and, in this context, the CCP was the surrogate 
of the U.S.S.R. in the struggle between these two countries, and in a 
growing atmosphere of capitalist - communist political paranoia. 
Hence, if Yan'an was far from the centers of China, geographically 
marginalized, and at first too trivial and primitive to be taken seri- 
ously, it became a lightening rod for conflicts of world significance. 
Secondly, one needs to remember too, that Yan'an represents an 
internecine struggle within the CCP itself, a product of factionalism 
in which a "republic of clandestinity" with its own murders, betray- 
als, tortures, went on between communists. In Yan'an this kind of 
killing stopped. But it was replaced by Rectification, which from 
1942 on became the point at which Mao's narratives and texts be- 
came the central focus of life in Yan'an itself. 
So much so that in Yan'an Mao's version of Marxism virtually be- 
came a form of revolutionary Platonism. Improvised military strate- 
gies, not all of them successful, but drawn from concrete events, 
victories and defeats, became elevated to doctrinal writs. These in 
turn were given the force of special insight, breaking the pattern of 
conventional beliefs but even more, elevating within Marxism, a lo- 
cal and homegrown variety which, provincial in origin became uni- 
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versalized, indeed seeking to become dominant within the discourse 
of Marxism itself. 
Beginning as a military redoubt, Yan'an became an instructional 
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community. Coming to power during the Long March, Mao, who 
was formerly more or less "exiled" from the party center now became 
the main actor in the party itself. His role as a military leader, an 
Odysseus figure wandering in the wilderness in seeking to redeem 
the lost patrimonies, changed into that of party chieftain and more, a 
Socratic figure, a rustic theoretician with insight into higher truths 
not visible to the naked eye. 
Three factors contributed to Mao's rise to power within the party. 
First he had to outwit those who threatened him in intellectual, 
ideological, administrative and military terms, and eliminate their 
support. In this respect he was a shrewd and supple adversary 
whose personal style easily led such opponents as Wang Ming, 
Zhang Guotao, and others who had major support either from 
within or outside the party to underestimate him. Second he was a 
remarkably good story teller who translated the history of China's 
"fall" in a context of double marginalization, the loss by the peasant 
of his patrimony to landlords, and the loss of the national patrimony 
into the imperialism, a process beginning with the Opium Wars and 
leading to a general condition of political chaos after the downfall of 
the Qing Dynasty. 
Contained within the long story are echoes of past struggles 
within present ones, as the Taiping rebellion. Its ecclesiastic lan- 
guage was now replaced in a reenactment of peasant rebellion and 
war. It is in the long story too that Mao developed his theory of a 
radicalized peasantry as an insurrectionary class. 
Inside the long story is an intermediate one. This involves the 
double conflict, war against the Japanese invader and revolution 
against the Guomindang. The two become intertwined in a continu- 
ously unfolding and shifting set of principles and strategies, an intri- 
cate intellectual ballet. At stake is not only which political entity, the 
CCP or the Guomindang, will succeed in claiming Sun Yat Sen's 
political inheritance. It is also over which side will represent an 
authentic Chinese political solution to the prevailing chaos, and also 
win the war against Japan. The moral issues of power are thus con- 
tained in a context of political chaos and war. The intermediate story 
"orders" this chaos in a context in which the Chinese Communist 
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Party succeeds against the overwhelming military power of its 
enemies, proving the moral superiority of its mission, the authentic- 
ity of its ideology, and the power that symbolic capital can generate 
against military and economic power. Not only was the GMD dis- 
credited in the process but the CCP and its Marxism becomes 
authentically "nationalized". 
Before this could happen, however, Mao and his cohorts had 
themselves to become dominant in the party. Hence the short story 
is one of struggle with opponents inside the party. Here the vicissi- 
tudes which the party had been subject to were turned upside-down. 
Defeats became testimonials to the failed logic of Mao's revolution- 
ary opponents and victories became evidence of Mao's superior in- 
sight and vision. As one goes from the intermediate to the short 
story, there are more and more "miracles" of survival, distinctive 
points for the reinterpretation of experience, the Battle of Jinggang 
Mountains, the Nanchang Uprising, Autumn Harvest Uprising, not 
to speak of the virtually biblical proportions of the Long March it- 
self, whereby the transition from the intermediate to the short story 
is made." In the year of wandering, the rapidly dwindling band of 
survivors who came to rest in Yan'an, far from the centers of China, 
holed up in caves and there recreated the lost revolutionary simula- 
crum under the most primitive conditions. The intermediate story 
recounts events like so many stations of the cross and like a biblical 
tale, arranges episodes of suffering, danger and death, in terms of 
sacrifice, martyrdom and survival. Guomindang China is, in this 
story, apostate in its relations with Japan, a party of sin to be over- 
come in order that China be rescued from the enemy and redeemed 
from itself. It is the long story which defines the project of redeeming 
the lost patrimonies and purification from a defiled and polluted 
state (with opium in its bloodstream) and overcoming a society to- 
tally corrupt. Each story is complete with events as metaphors of loss 
and redemption. 
And each is an occasion for logical instruction. The story of peas- 
ant loss and national patrimonies expropriated by imperialism is a 
metonymy for primitive accumulation in compradore capitalism,' ru- 
ral squeeze and the plunder of China's resources. The intermediate 
story is the question of the stage of the struggle and how to convert a 
national and bourgeois democratic revolution into a communist one. 
The third is the shift from a theory of proletarian revolution to a 
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peasant revolution in which the party becomes elevated above the 
class and the instrument of the disjunctive break in the absence of a 
large and functional proletariat. 
In the three stories Mao triumphs within the CCP as the agent of 
the larger history. As the stories focus on Yan'an, Mao becomes the 
agent of his own story telling, his image becoming larger and larger 
in the optic of the stories themselves. He moves from a military pe- 
riphery to the party center and displaces those previously at the 
center. He transforms himself from an Odysseus wandering on the 
Long March and seeking to recover the lost patrimony to a Socratic 
agent with a superior truth waiting to be liberated by him. 
The parallelism between story telling and theory construction, 
myth and logic, narrative and text was carefully orchestrated and 
choreographed. Yan'an became an instructional community as the 
survivors of the Long March were joined by thousands of young 
Chinese who crossed through Japanese lines, it was systematized as 
a corpus. Living in caves revolutionaries became students. From 
1943 on their syllabi required detailed analysis and intensive dis- 
cussion of 22 texts, some Marxist-Leninist, some Stalinist, some 
Maoist. Each of the texts recapitulated elements of the long, inter- 
mediate, and short stories as "evidence" for the truth claims and su- 
perior strategies of Mao and his followers. 
Stories and theories worked like nesting boxes, each fitting into 
the other. Time became foreshortened as events moved into the pre- 
sent in a context of decisive confrontations, war and revolution. 
Symbolic condensation, foreshortening of history, converted past 
into the present in which Mao become the center of his own stories. 
In turn, time became space, i.e. Yan'an which now took on the prop- 
erties of a revolutionary simulacrum poised half way between the 
revolutionary struggle up to the present, and the means of trans- 
forming the future. 
For this latter projective goal to be realized everyone had to know 
both the language and the logic embodied in the texts, down to vir- 
tually identical ways of expressing them. Countless meetings, pam- 
phlets, campaigns, drenched concrete experience in words and 
documents. Each individual experience was conveyed to the group. 
Individual stories were fitted into these three collective ones. In turn 
each individual translated his or her experiences into the theoretical 
language prescribed. Education became a means of overcoming ig- 
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norance, illiteracy, ill formed and previous ideas, so that knowledge 
as an individual overcoming project was subsumed under the col- 
lective one. Individuals merged their personal experience in the col- 
lective one, and drew down a superior form of insight and knowl- 
edge, a form of empowerment. In Yan'an the party became the sur- 
rogate for a universalizing theory with transcendent ends. 
I emphasize events as story telling and theory construction as 
crucial ingredients in the constructed mytho-logics of the party. But 
as a process of symbolic condensation in which Yan'an becomes the 
revolutionary fulcrum, an Archimedes point, it suggests the signifi- 
cance of symbolic capital in generating organizational loyalties, dis- 
cipline, insight, and obligation. Indeed, this was the particular ac- 
complishment of the Rectification Campaign which beginning in late 
1942 transformed a somewhat more tolerant political community 
into a highly disciplined one. Rectification permanently marked both 
the party and its adherents. It employed strategies of confession and 
purification to root out remnants of the conventional doxa. It was 
facilitated in Yan'an by the arrangement and organization of the 
community in small living and study groups, organized around in- 
structional centers, universities, military academies, arts and litera- 
ture institutes. Its messages were extended through the use of thea- 
ter, arts, writings. Everyone in Yan'an became involved in the crea- 
tion and dispersion of the discourse according to approved rules and 
by a process of exegetical bonding which seemed to offer new in- 
sights into the self as well as society. So much so that individual 
overcoming projects became intertwined with the larger and collec- 
tive ones in an atmosphere of purity and danger. Before rectification 
Yan'an appeared to such foreigners as Edgar Snow and Agnes 
Smedley as a radical version of the New Jerusalem with all the 
power that conviction and logic can endow. Afterwards, although 
not for Snow, it took on more confining  characteristic^.^' 
What were the longer term effects of such story telling, mythmak- 
ing, narrative retrievals, and logic, theory, dialectical modes of ex- 
planation and projection? They produced a remarkable degree of 
symbolic capital in compensation for the lack of economic and other 
forms. They combined within the corpus of Mao Zedong Thought as 
an inversionary discourse based on a theory of marginalization of 
the peasantry and a politics of repossession and transformation. 
They produced an interior language so that the participants became 
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a people of their own texts, a shared sense of empowerment, a vali- 
dating truth, and a remarkable level of commitment and integrity. 
Once the CCP came to power in China, Yan'an became the legiti- 
mizing myth of the revolution. The stories became ritualized, set 
pieces of a history which faded into China's infinite past. The revo- 
lutionary disjunction which was to become a process of irreversible 
change to a higher form of social existence based on the superior 
knowledge of Mao's formulation, became the basis for a new form of 
bureaucratization. The discourse became hegemonic. So much so 
that even Mao attempted to explode it from within. What he must 
have recognized is the curious impotence that results from the 
transition of an inversionary discourse into a dominant one. It does 
not generalize freedom in the resolution of the social problem but 
bureaucratizes the social problem and becomes hegemonic. In the 
end not only did this produce widespread dissatisfaction and the 
chaos of the Cultural Revolution. It led to the counter simulacrum 
which was tragically destroyed in Tiananmen Square on the morn- 
ing of June 4,1989. 
What we can see in Yan'an is how discourse, constituted a form of 
moral exchange involving symbolically loaded signs and signifiers 
interior to the Yan'anites, setting that community apart not only 
from the rest of Chinese society but segregating them from opposing 
factions within the party itself. There were many other base areas 
but none assumed significance in these terms. Moreover, such 
"interiority", counterpoised against "exteriorization", distanced 
Yan'an from the rest of society morally and in terms of political 
commitment. It defined the positive pole to society's negative pole 
with the task of absorbing the latter into the former, i.e. the generali- 
zation of the CCP into society as a whole and by the use of state 
power. The Yan'anites as an surrogate instrument for a moral dis- 
course now sought to permeate and endow with special meaning 
virtually every act of society from the most ordinary to the most 
politically esoteric. The result was to use the corpus of Mao Zedong 
and the texts compressed into the parables of the Little Red Book as 
a method of exegetical bonding, symbolic intensification and con- 
densation. 
Embedded, too, in nature of the struggle was the premise and 
promise not only of a political transcendence after the revolutionary 
disjunctive struggle, but a developmental solution. This solution in- 
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volved the generation of massive amounts of symbolic capital into 
economic capital and to recapitulate on a state level what was the ac- 
complishment of Yan'an. Moreover, the objective was to increase the 
importance of symbolic capital as a form of mutualism which eradi- 
cated self interest, to prevent a return to what Elster has called 
methodological individualism. Hence the continuous alternation 
strategies, loosening up and liberalizing, cracking down, left becom- 
ing right, right becoming left, and with each turn of the screw, the 
identification by the state of enemies to be eliminated, and, of 
course, victims, reaching a crescendo during the Cultural Revolution 
itself. The party as the agent delegated the responsibility of extend- 
ing collective individualism from Yan'an to the state itself, became, 
at the same time, subject to the return to interests and methodologi- 
cal individualism inherent in economic capital. In this fashion sym- 
bolic capital, instead of generating economic capital, became the 
false consciousness of the Maoist party-state instead of as intended, 
the consolidation point of irreversable change. 
Neither Mao nor his associates were prepared for the bureaucrati- 
zation of both party and state and within it the return to patterns of 
political and social life deeply embedded in Chinese society now 
emerging within the party and the bureaucracy. Hence, Mao found 
himself supporting his own version of permanent revolution. But 
here his text left off. There was no projected logic of prescribed ends. 
Yan'an became the ritualized myth of a revolution increasingly dis- 
credited by the efforts to prop it up and for the old Yan'anites, a form 
of nostalgia for what might have been. In the name of a Chinese 
Spartanism and self discipline it has resulted in guanxi socialism a 
politics of localized interests in which party officials are only one 
particular category of entrepreneurs among many. 
The Cosmocratic Impulse 
Fashions in violence have changed just as types of political analysis 
have. Revolutionary ideological movements are out while more 
ethnically or religiously inspired are in. Nevertheless, I believe that 
the Yan'an case continues to work very well to illustrate both in gen- 
eral and particular ways how inversionary discourse theory works. 
Mao's putative Marxism, ostensibly structural, i.e. as system of de- 
velopmental and historical transformation applied to the historical 
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evolution of China, in fact constitutes a mixture of interpretive 
strategies which make use of "objectivized" categories to disguise the 
element of contingency, recasting it as historical mythology and 
programmatic utopianism. Indeed, looking back on the Yan'an pe- 
riod, we can see clearly how presumed historical truths were embod- 
ied in narratives which, mixing fact with fantasy, realized them- 
selves in the form of myths - myths constituting what might be 
called the "imaginary real". From such an imaginary real Mao con- 
structed a dialectical and millennia1 logic which served in effect as a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. 
We have seen how in Yan'an and under conditions of civil war 
and invasion, a projective millennialism was formed out of a particu- 
lar reading of history. Selected events, made promontory by means 
of retrieving narratives provided the materials for a projective mil- 
lennialism. With them, and indeed, embodied in the narrative were 
texts which, in an ostensible context of education, generated a tute- 
lary and mobilizing community with its own theory and language. 
So much so that those who joined the revolution became not mem- 
bers but Yan'anites - a chosen people, a people of the texts if not the 
book. 
As to the discourse itself, it exhibited a particular recounting of a 
more general set of properties including a definition of marginaliza- 
tion in terms of loss, dispersion, depatrimonialization at the hands of 
enemies and traducers, imperialists, compradores, etc. In the actual 
narrativizing of history what was cultivated was a retrospective an- 
ger and the cultivation of a restorative yearning. These were cast in 
the form of a peasantry surrogate for historical process and a com- 
mitment to specified higher moral goals, logical and revelatory,- 
deductively formed into binding obligations on the basis of the 
shared insight of dialectical understanding. These elements can be 
applied to other discourse communities, ethnic or linguistic, or racial 
or religious, in which actions of violence form into social texts from 
which can be derived certain categorical political imperatives. Re- 
quired for this is a cosmocratic political leader able to translate these 
ingredients into the immediate context of lived experiences. 
But whose discourse was it? The quick answer in Yan'an is also a 
general answer for inversionary discourse movements generally. It 
was the discourse of the Great Interpreter, one which he or she did 
not appear to have fashioned by his or her self. One might say that 
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discourse communities are invariably a realization of a certain sym- 
bolic and linguistic choreograhy designed by the cosmocrat leader 
and his or her immediate band of acolytes. Cosmocrats give Voice, 
but in a fashion which implies that they are vehicles through which 
pass higher truths. They do not invent. They interpret what is already 
invented, in the process adding something of their own including 
the freshness of their own and the common experience. Cosmocrats 
are the catalytic converters of discourse. They possess special quali- 
ties not least of which is a certain impersonal personalism or abstract 
personalism which makes them both superhuman and human si- 
multaneously. 
They may use their own life histories to endow themselves with a 
convincing commonality, while proving their exceptionality by 
maintaining distance. They are one with others, and apart. Which 
gives them the quality of an insider-outsider. They also acquire 
morally attractive roles. 
Mao Zedong is a case in point. As already suggested, he was first 
an Odysseus figure, exiled twice, once from family and personal 
friends to become a wanderer experiencing homelessness and vul- 
nerablity, later within the party, where he was distanced from the 
center and turned to his home province for sustenance and recu- 
peration. In both cases he came to stand for the lost patrimony. And 
like Odysseus, through suffering and danger he gained the shrewd- 
ness and wisdom to recapture it. The exile's return is the triumph of 
the collective will. 
And, disguised by a style of personal reticence the appearance of 
natural modesty, was a profoundly ambitious Socratic pretension 
which drove him to become the self appointed and party anointed 
agent of history. In both roles he could give voice to truths and like 
Lenin, project a future complete with rules for more virtuous living. 
In these contexts Mao manipulated violence. He did not simply 
react to provocation. He orchestrated it, even choreographed it. He 
found work for all manner of insurrectionaries and terrorists. He 
played with his intellectuals treating them now as high priests, then 
as shamans, and finally converted them into political fetishists of his 
revohtionary enterprise.29 Whatever his politics was, it was always a 
surrogate for something else. 
Those who, in opposing him, failed to make these connections, 
were quickly penalized. No one in Mao's revolution was allowed the 
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luxury of innocence. One was for or against and if for, was expected 
to be willing to sacrifice. Discipline, will, martyrdom, yes. Mediation 
no.30 Despite the appearances of the United Front. 
To be an insider meant learning the codes. Once learned these en- 
abled them to interpret both their own immediate circumstances, 
and, antagonistically those of their opponents. In this sense what 
went on in the Chinese revolution were neither "discursive ex- 
changes" between rival ideologies, nor occasions for discursive oblit- 
eration. If, as already suggested, time was foreshortened leading to 
the present, and converted into space - the terrain of Yan'an becom- 
I ing a revolutionary simulacrum, so its "sovereignty" was a moral 
one, challenging the larger authority of the ~ationalists.~' In the 
praxis that went with the theory killers regarded themselves as heal- 
ers - healers killed. Postponed outcomes encouraged struggle as a 
way of life. Significant events piled up and accumulated, and were 
cosmocratically transformed into revolutionary metaphors. Death 
was estheticized martyrdom. Within the space of Yan'an, sur- 
rounded by its mountains and loess hills, there was theater, drama, 
music, spectacle, continuous study, interminable meetings, rein- 
forced by insignia, weapons, and the totems and taboos of an inte- 
rior order.32 So constituted, Yan'an as a discourse community was 
centered between boundaries of purity and danger, to provide a sac- 
erdotal efficacy.33 Here memory became desire, retrieval and projec- 
tion pathos. One might say that in these terms Yan'an became a 
Tantric circle with Mao at the center.34 
Once the millennialism had become ritualized, the method canni- 
balized, the party bureaucratized and the radical state even more 
rigid than its predecessor, it became one of the several objects of the 
Cultural Revolution to restore and re-generate the Yan'an discourse, 
to prop up a rapidly failing moral momentum, and restore the Tan- 
tric circle with Mao at the center. The party, suspicious of disjunctive 
radical solutions and even more so the logic accompanying them 
saw Mao as part of the problem rather than the solution. What re- 
mained of the Yan'an of the moral moment of 1936-1943 became the 
cultural property of its survi~ors,3~ the vanishing point of a revolu- 
tionary legend and the authorizing myth of the Maoist state.36 
The Maoism that formed in that original "simulacrum" Yan'an 
realized itself in a totalizing and "irreversible" revolutionary com- 
munity. Its discourse produced symbolic capital in the absence of the 
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economic kind. It sought to realize itself as a midpoint in history and 
a midwife of national revolution. What it established, and that only 
temporarily, was a "tribe" in which the discourse conferred a surro- 
gate kinship on all those within it linked to the totemic figure of 
Mao. 
So powerful was this radical kinship that it pervaded the 19 other 
base areas, generating a field of force beyond its boundaries. It spon- 
sored imaginative leaps within the so-called framework of Marxism- 
Leninism and theoretical twists which, pragmatic and dialectical, 
defined more tightly the theoretical space in which Mao occupied 
the center. Unlike Lenin, for whom the proletariat represented an 
inversionary or revolutionary class with radical brains, Mao had to 
work with an essentially insurrectionary peasantry of radical chains. 
So defined this gave the party its unique role, to supply the radical 
brains in the absence of a large proletariat. 
But brains alone could only be important if it also became incum- 
bent on all the insiders to learn the "tribal language". By learning the 
lessons of revolutionary "texts" new insights would be instilled. The 
"elect" would thus gain privileged insight into the dynamics of po- 
litical and social life, leading to a "higher" understanding of causes 
and likely effects, from which superior strategies for revolutionary 
action against the Guomindang and the pursuit of the war against 
the Japanese invader were derived. 
In this sense by means of a process of exegetical bonding, and in a 
context of inner party struggles, civil war, and anti-imperialism, the 
discourse was totally inversionary, casting out alternatives, liberal- 
istic, the fascist Methodism of Chiang Kai-shek, as well as more or- 
thodox forms of communist doctrine. This preferred inversionary 
discourse was celebrated and validated in every aspect of organized 
life, from sports, to ballet, to opera, to poetry, etc. 
Each incorporated the same themes, loss, displacement, and po- 
litical yearning, peasants marginalized through the loss of their pat- 
rimonies, the state through loss of the national patrimony to the im- 
perialists. Each converted the peasants from "invisibility" to extreme 
visibility, each aspect of dress, work, action portrayed with descrip- 
tive realism and ritualized scenarios. Making peasants visible in this 
sense ratified and sinified the revolution. 
The Long March was the high road to Yan'an. The road away from 
it was the successful transition from radical tribalism to state; power. 
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The transition negated virtually all the original objectives. From 
radical tribe to hegemonic state is virtually a textbook version of 
Foucault's paradox. And so it with the conclusion both came too - a 
variant of the doctrine of permanent r ev~ lu t ion .~~  
Did Mao himself realize that no final resolution of negative con- 
tradictions is possible and no resolving theory of his would work to 
the general good? More interesting - did he know it at the start? For 
I it is not necessary that the high priests of religion believe in it, but 
I only its adherents. Did he realize the nature of the movement he had 
1 promulgated and that only by maintaining revolutionary momen- 
1 tum could he keep the discourse alive, and only by keeping the dis- 
I course alive could he maintain revolutionary momentum? 
There are no clear answers to such questions. But it is clear that 
Mao's view of politics was always perverse. And if we find in it evi- 
dence for some of the ingredients we call Foucault's paradox, the ul- 
timate paradox is that its only solution is that a violence feeds on it- 
self above and beyond any normal considerations of interest or ra- 
tionality. Indeed, it helps explain why for some movements ending 
violence is the end of the world while violent struggle is the begin- 
ning of it. 
For Mao self generated violence became the revolutionary neces- 
sity. There was neither defeat, victory or mediation. The revolution 
which he made, and in the end came to oppose had succeeded in all 
its ostensible objects. It rid itself of invading and imperial powers. It 
freed itself from a tyrannical regime whose long standing injustices 
it rectified. In short its accomplishments became the instruments of 
its demise.38 
In Yan'an it is possible to see how the immediate past became a 
plunderable resource for the CCP affording the materials for a nar- 
rative out of which an inversionary discourse was formed and with 
redeeming and transformational objects. It is an interesting case be- 
cause, as with Plato's Republic, it appeared to reveal higher truths 
realized in superior strategies within a field of civil as well as mili- 
tary force. Simultaneously there was another struggle within the 
CCP over which brand of logocentric Marxism would be dominant 
within the movement and prevail in the party. 
And what this somewhat rambling excursion also suggests is that 
the original Marxian project, a resolution of contradictions, a politics 
of disjunctive and transformational solutions failed entirely in 
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China, as it did in the U.S.S.R., illustrating the general truth of the 
Foucaultian paradox. 
Yet this does not mean it had no consequence. Its consequence 
was in the moral moment itself. For each such moment intensifies 
pathos, and with it a yearning for solutions even though they will 
not work. Indeed, it is the attempt to make them work which causes 
revolutionaries to commit new crimes. As a result, in what began as 
a mobilization space, a revolutionary simulacrum, within which 
story telling and logical explanation changed the meaning of acts 
and intentions within a recoded system of signs, tropes and other 
forms of interior signaling, a turning point was reached when all 
these became formulaic. It might be that formulaic coding is a good 
basis for durable communicative networks and communicative acts. 
The irony of Yan'an is that as its moral moment ended and its formu- 
laic period began, it came closest to the form, although not the spirit, 
of Habermas' ideal speech situation.39 
Foucault's Paradox and Permanent Revolution 
No doubt Mao himself saw it coming.40 The problem was how to 
salvage the overcoming project from the disillusionment of the failed 
solution. It is at this point that the revolutionary project shifts to the 
explosion of the superstructures and the idea of a continuing revo- 
lution which if it never succeeds on its own terms is essential to po- 
litical life. It is in this context that like Mao, Foucault comes to repre- 
sent the general disillusion with politically liberating solutions 
leaving only violence itself as the perpetually liberating project. Mao 
turned it against the party and the state. Foucault turned it against 
himself. 
If every dominant discourse is intrinsically hegemonic no matter 
how liberating its intents, so only a continuous anti-hegemonic 
struggle constitutes a valid politics then what is the point? One pos- 
sibility is that at the end of their lives and in their different ways 
both Mao and Foucault liberate us from solutions altogether. But in 
fact neither came to such a conclusion, Each turned to violation - the 
violation of the body politic which in fact collectivizes what was for 
Foucault the violation of an individual body. Foucault's paradox is 
embodied in a dialectic of mutual violation. That is the individual 
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body is violated by the social body which sees itself violated by 
those who it defines outside its proprietary boundaries. 
If no movement achieves either its goals or its programs on its 
own terms and each in the effort to do so reconstitutes the power of 
the dominant discourse why then favor inversionary discourse and 
emancipatory project, especially if one's view of politics is disjunc- 
tive rather than ameliorating. The answer for Foucault, as it was for 
Nietzsche, is that dominant discourse in even the best regulated so- 
ciety is repugnant in the violations and wounds it imposes on its 
victims. Foucault sees the result of democracies for example, not in 
the form of some Nietzschean prejudice against mediocracy, or the 
soggy qualities of Christian citizenship, but a terrible anger over the 
plight of the Victim caught in the trap of the infinitely postponed 
rectification. So the Victim is a figure in chains. Hence his is a poli- 
tics of inversionar confrontation but apolitical in regard to more 
general solutions. 4 7  
However, one regards Foucault and his proposed non-solutions, 
he opens up a way of looking at politics which emphasizes the mat- 
ter of boundaries, exclusions and inclusions, victimization and in- 
visibility, and in terms far beyond the ordinary one of pressing 
claims and pursuing interests. For him modern states employ the 
discourse of science as the basis of exclusionary practices, reinforcing 
with metaphors of pollution, infection, etc. those at the margin, with 
cordons sanitaire around sequestered populations in the form of 
prisons, insane asylums, ghettoes, etc. Indeed, insofar as Foucault 
remains devoted to Nietzsche it is to state the larger principle within 
the idea of continuous inversion, that it is necessary in order to real- 
ize man's humanity in a world in which the great obstacle is "the 
spirit of modern culture" itself. 42 
Where the latter looks to the aermensch as a solution, Foucault 
looks to the Untermensch. His project is to expose the hidden vio- 
lence in conventional modes of politics. Even the mildest version of 
the dominant discourse contains negative hegemonic elements. 
Why? Because those at the outer fringes of the permissible no matter 
how fortuitous the cause of their situation serve to substantiate the 
foundational moral code embodied in the dominant discourse. 
Hence every dominant discourse generates a quota of Victims neces- 
sary to its functioning. Their proportion, and the conditions of their 
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existence constitute for Foucault the standard for judging the state as 
a whole. 
The Victim, then, only appears to stand in an equivalent position 
as Hegel's slaves to masters. But there is no conviction that by lib- 
erating the slave one also liberates the master. Foucault is more con- 
cerned with the Necessary Victim. His Thief, Murderer, the Mad- 
man, Homosexual are both violators and violating. The thief violates 
the sacrosanct rules of property and the discourse which sanctifies it. 
The murderer violates the presumed sanctity of life itself and de- 
stroys its self-regarding innocence. The madman defies rationality 
and disrupts the necessary connections between the artful intelli- 
gence and rules controlling the human capacity to make reasoned 
choices. The homosexual violates "nature" as a procreational con- 
nection of family and as such disorders the ordering properties of 
kinship. These four categories are of particular interest to Foucault 
because they represent a fundamental "ordering" of social life for 
which there are corresponding institutions - and institutions of con- 
finement and sequester. So too, deviancy is defined and any 
"marginal", i.e. at the fringe of society, inside or outside its permis- 
sible boundaries is a potential victim. From the point of view of so- 
ciety and the state such Victims are transgressors and trespassers. By 
their very existence they dilute the proper functioning of society and 
violate its rules and c0des.4~ 
Foucault does not restrict his discussions to historical examples. 
He turns attention to the "phenomenology" of victimness. For ex- 
ample a murderer has a persona within the general category. Look at 
that persona from within and the category dissolves. Such dissolu- 
tion, however, can not be permitted because it would dissolve the 
boundaries required by the dominant discourse. For in this view the 
dominant discourse creates the Victim and depends on the Victim. 
The victim does not create his or her own c0ndition.4~ Foucault's 
then is the theory of transgressive liberation. It is like Jean Genet's 
The Thief's Journal, a revolt by the revolting.45 Violation, disgusting 
practices, discomforting and discomfiting dress and social objects 
are crucial to effectiveness. Scandal is its enterprise. 
Constituting his own version of a Heideggerian synthesis, a con- 
sciousness of the meanings of the events within a life space, Foucault 
turns our attention to the way in which marginality works from 
within, the sense of the life world of the victim. It is not so surprising 
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because this coincides with the elements of his own life as a victim. 
His theories may be said to be a personal transcendence over his 
own predicaments, a translation of the consciousness of the personal 
condition in which he found himself and was then imposed on him. 
It is a consciousness heightened by suffering, a struggle involving 
definitions of loss (even to his own name), and recuperation through 
transmutation, the mortification of the body personal transformed 
into an inversionary discourse on the body politic, and purposefully 
subversive in intent. 
The post-modern view increasingly favors the Foucaultian para- 
dox. Every dominant discourse represents itself as ordinary common 
sense, a doxa. Embedded in this common sense are Victims and 
negative boundaries. Hence the permanent need for inversionary 
discourse to shatter the prevailing opaqueness, the false transpar- 
ency of the dominant discourse. Thus by focussing on the discourse 
of the damned, the segregated from the rest of the society, those in- 
habiting secret spaces, jails, hideouts, bath houses, who live within 
boundaries marked off from the rest of society, intrinsic to it but not 
of it Foucault's Victims keep transforming the center. 
Whether Foucault and his ideas "return", or Mao's or those of 
Marx, many turn out to be less important than the impaction of in- 
versionary discourse through violence on state and society. The 
implication of Foucault's paradox and the best part of the inversion- 
ary discourse it suggests is the refinement in the definition of vic- 
timness such that deficiencies in the principles and practices of eq- 
uity are fine-tuned and exposed. It argues for a continuous struggle 
against all forms of marginality and social distancing even while 
recognizing that to resolve one only locates another. Underlying this 
is an ultimate purpose, to prevent a total "embourgeoisement of the 
mind". In this sense inversionary discourse and the movements they 
sponsor, are essential both to the dominant discourse as well as its 
victims. Otherwise even the best ordered democracy would become 
little more than a plurality of entrenched mediocratic hierarchies op- 
erating through self-reinforcing discursive codes, practices, networks 
of meaning and social relationships. 
The worst feature of inversionary discourse is the dangers it poses 
to democracy especially when it seeks to throw into contempt its 
legislative and judicial instruments, above all the vote itself, as little 
more than snares which ensure that people are made complicit in 
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their own illusions. When, in the name of a higher truth, democracy, 
even in its social democratic mode, is charged with being intrinsi- 
cally trivializing to the human personality, destructive of the very 
human potentiality which it claims to enhance, then conflict may 
turn into more fundamental struggle. Conflict is endemic in the 
democratic process. More fundamental struggle is not. Where to 
draw the line is what might be called the perpetual point of danger 
for demo~racies.~~ 
In this respect there are always a good many would-be versions of 
Foucault's Great Interpreter, less Nietzschean fhermensch than ro- 
mantic facsimile. Whether the discourse they employ takes the form 
of religious revivalism, fundamentalism, or ideological revisionism, 
there are victims who can serve as raw materials for the narratives 
and texts, the inversionary discourse out of which symbolic capital 
can be formed. Which suggests that there is no way to resolve Fou- 
cault's paradox. Mao is dead. So is Foucault. But all around us is the 
evidence of how a good many efforts to exorcise victimness wind up 
producing victims of their own. As Dreyfus and Rabinow put it, "As 
long as the interpretive sciences continue to search for a deep truth, 
that is, to practice a hermeneutics of suspicion, as long as they pro- 
ceed on the assumption that it is the Great interpreter who has 
privileged access to meaning, while insisting that the truths they un- 
cover lie outside the sphere of power, these sciences seem fated to 
contribute to the strategies of power. They claim a privileged exter- 
nality, but they are actually part of the deployment of power"?7 
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NOTES 
1 Foucault, since he was within a about himself. Morally, therefore, 
group that was "without", i.e. be- one starts out with a sense of the 
yond the acceptable boundaries of ambiguity of one's role and to some 
civil society even more than state, extent therefore, part of the prob- 
had an interior view even when he lem rather than the solution. 
tried to destroy it analytically. He Studying political violence in this 
was, in much of his theory, talking sense can never be innocent. 
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2 It is also somewhat doubtful that 
even the most ardent advocates of 
the inversionary transformation ge- 
nuinely believed in the wisdom of 
their ideas except in some me- 
taphorical way. Despite their ablu- 
tions and genuflections before their 
sanctified "others", it was the claim 
itself which offered exemption 
from ordinary moral sense (in fa- 
vor of a revolutionary one) rather 
than its truth. It is an old theme. 
3 See Hannah Arendt, On ~ o l u t i o n  
(New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 
54. 
4 It is no wonder that to prevent 
themselves from the social invisi- 
bility prescribed by the dominant 
discourse, including the discourse 
of "equality", African-American S L ~  
culture includes violence against the 
body, pathologies of self-destruction 
as well as crimes against property 
and people who represent the 
dominant discourse, and a semiot- 
ics of protest, from dreadlocks to 
guns, and from ghetto boxes to rap 
music. 
5 In contrast Foucault's inversionary 
discourse never achieved a moral 
moment - nor could it. Nor did 
Marx quite succeed in realizing one 
in his own lifetime. Indeed, his dis- 
appointment was double, the fai- 
lures of the Paris Communes of 
1848 and 1870, (although he mana- 
ged to make a good deal of those 
failures for the development of his 
political ideas). In this sense both 
the Bolshevik and Chinese revolu- 
tions were a post-Marx dedouble- 
ment. For both Mao and Lenin real- 
ized in their respective revolu- 
tionary moral moments, the "re- 
deeming" proletariat or peasantry, 
the disjunctive break, and a projec- 
tive historicism. 
6 The Gauche Proletarienne in Paris in 
1968 and as well the Situationists. 
7 What has been called discourse theory 
draws on a variety of sources, literary 
as well philosophical, and of course 
from several of the social sciences. 
Such theory can be reworked so that it 
applies to inversionaly movements of 
various types, from revolutionary in- 
surrection and terrorism to extra-in- 
stitutional protest. 
8 A good example is Armed Insurrec- 
tion, ostensibly published in Swit- 
zerland under the false imprimatur 
of Zurich: Otto Meyer, 1928 as Der 
bezvaffnete Aufstand, and in a later 
version in French as L'insurrection 
armee in 1931. A textbook of revo- 
lutionary insurrections each case is 
written by an author with a fictio- 
nal name under the general autho- 
rity of the Organizing Secretary of 
the Comintern (Piatnitsky). 
9 There is a sense, of course, in which 
the approach favored here is as old 
as thinking about politics. Indeed, 
ever since Plato the power of dis- 
course, its components and the 
realization of its consequences has 
itself been a discourse running 
throughout political analysis. He 
was the first to emphasize how di- 
scursive practices, religious, eccle- 
siastical, secular, logical, logocen- 
tric in form constitute a system in 
which words and meanings have 
performative consequences. Revo- 
lutionary Platonism is concerned 
with how to convert logically deri- 
ved truths to actions. In this way 
words intertwine with deeds and 
even when disordering in intent, 
they constitute systems of order, 
organized killing and healing. A 
revolutionary movement may in- 
deed prepare text books on insur- 
rectionary strategy constructed 
around the curative or purging ef- 
fects of violence - violence as a ne- 
cessary curative prescription. 
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10 See Raymond Aron, History and the 
Dialectic of Violence (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1975). 
11 See Roland Barthes, Elements of Se- 
miology (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1964). 
12 See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline $a Theory 
of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1972). As will become 
readily apparent the present usage of 
the term departs from Bourdieu's. It 
constitutes a fund of collectivized and 
interpretative to which individuals 
make contributions and withdrawals 
rather than noneconomic forms of ex- 
change. 
13 See Hannah Arendt, On Revolution 
(New York: Viking Press, 1963). See 
also Clarence Crane Brinton, The Ja- 
cobins (New York: Russell and Rus- 
sell, Inc., 1961). Brinton's emphasis 
on the iconography and perform- 
ance aspects of political violence 
has been examined further in Mona 
Ozouf, La fete revolutionnaire, 1789- 
1799 (Paris: Gallimard, 1966). These 
themes can not only be applied to 
disjunctive revolutionary themes. 
They can be extended to such 
movements as the Mau Mau upris- 
ing in Kenya in the 1950's which 
involved ritualized violations of 
conventional sexual, excretory, and 
other taboos associated with the 
body and around which social 
practices were constructed. Mau 
Mau, at least those "decentered" 
and living in the forests under the 
most primitive hardship conditions 
lived up to the extreme social 
marginality (barbarians, monkeys, 
etc.) that was assigned to them 
within the dominant colonial dis- 
course as practiced in the white 
community in Kenya. There are 
many such movements in which 
"outrageous" sin serves as a form of 
bonded liberation and an interest- 
ing literature on the subject which 
includes Sade, Bataille, and Fou- 
cault. See Denis Hollier ed., The College 
of Sociology 1937-39 (Minneapolis: The 
University of Minnesota Press, 1988). 
See also, John Barrell, The lnfction of 
Thomas De Quincy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991), pp. 147-156, 
and Stephen J. Greenblatt, "Filthy 
Rites" in Learning to Curse (New York 
and London: Routledge, 1990)) pp. 59- 
79. 
14 Or as Aron puts it, from the Bastille 
to the Kremlin. For an analysis of 
the problem of Jacobinism, terror 
and democracy see Francois Furet, 
Antoine Liniers, and Philippe Ray- 
naud, Terrorisme et democratie (Paris: 
Fayard, 1985). 
15 As used here political violence is 
situated between random violence, 
i.e. outbreaks, mobs, which have a 
more or less random quality and no 
specific political objects, and war, 
the highly structured rational pur- 
suit of military conquest by one or 
several nations over another or 
others. Political violence falls with- 
in these outer limits. Within these 
limits political violence takes the 
one or several forms, each with its 
own organizational dynamics, extra- 
institutional protest, insurrectionary 
insurrection, and terrorism. In all three 
discourse theory applies. 
16 Although there are plenty of resi- 
dual revolutionaries like Guzman 
and his cohorts in the Sendero Lu- 
minoso in Peru. 
17 A list of the movements in one c o ~ t r y  
alone, like India, would literally ex- 
haust the alphabet of acronyms. 
18 See Patrick Combes, La Litterature et 
le Mouvement de Mai 68 (Paris: 
Seghers, 1984). See also Roland Bi- 
ard, Histoire du Movement Anarchiste 
1945-1975 (Paris: Editions Galilee, 
1976), and A. Belden Fields, Trot- 
skyism and Maoism (New York: 
Praeger, 1988). 
19 See Martin Kramer, "The Moral Lo- 
gic of Hizballah" in Walter Reich, 
36 The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 10 0 95 
I Foucault's Paradox 
I 
ed., Origins of Terrorism (New York: 
I 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
I pp. 131-157. See also David Moss, 
The Politics of Left-Wing Violence in 
Italy, 1969-85 (London: Macmillan, 
1989), and Stefan Aust, The B&- 
Meinhoff Group (London: The Bodley 
Head, 1987). 
I 20 There is indeed a large body of lit- 
I erature relevant to the examination 
of the levels and layered meanings 
1 of violence, from Marx to Mao, 
1 Sade to Bataille, Levi-Strauss and 
I 
I Barthes to Ricoeur, Foucault, Bour- 
1 dieu and Baudrillard, and from Ja- 
I cobins to modern Situationists, 
1 with occasional nods in the direc- 
tion of Futurism, Constructivism, 
Dadaism, Surrealism, and, modes 
of exploding the ordinariness of 
daily life, not a little of it pure po- 
litical theater. 
21 Or, to modify Marx's XIth thesis on 
Feuerbach ("The philosophers have 
only interpreted the world, in vari- 
ous ways; the point, however, is to 
change it."), the point is to change 
the world by reinterpreting it. 
22 The functionally significant take 
full possession of their patrimony 
to produce a mutualistic civil soci- 
ety with the revolutionary dicta- 
torship of the proletariat as an in- 
terim. That is it remains in order to 
preside over the disappearance of 
surplus value and to ensure that the 
entire civil society receives the full pro- 
ceeds of the value it produces. 
23 See Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of 
Evil (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). 
24 In more general terms Mao defined 
a negative pole to be transcended 
and the starting point where struc- 
tural components of an inversio- 
nary theory are "activated" in 
events, where interpretative retrie- 
val and reenactment becomes part 
of a phenomenology of overcoming 
through which, through interpretation, 
people 5 to transcend their individual 
predicaments. 
25 See Jonathan Spence, The Gate of 
Heavenly Peace (London: Penguin 
Books, 1982), pp. 312-313. 
26 See David E. Apter and Tony Saich, 
Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Re- 
public (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- 
versity Press, 1994). 
27 The Long March, which occurred 
after the Fifth Extermination Cam- 
paign launched by the GMD a- 
gainst the CCP ended in the loss of 
the Jiangxi base, the original re- 
volutionary simulacrum contains 
ingredients which are equivalent in 
scope to the biblical crossing of the 
Red Sea and the creation of a New 
Jerusalem. Involving a year of wan- 
dering through many parts of 
China, as in some Levi-Straussian 
myth, it included remarkable ex- 
ploits of heroic proportions, im- 
possible obstacles overcome, the 
crossing over hostile terrains, the 
passing through ethnic boundaries 
snowy mountains and treacherous 
savannah. It is also during the 
Long March that Mao comes to 
power, and in contention with the 
leaders of the Comintern. 
28 See Edgar Snow, Red Star Ovw China 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1947). 
29 See Michael Taussig, Shamanism, 
Colonialism, and the Wild Man 
(Chicago: The University of Chica- 
go Press, 1991). 
30 See Frantz Fanon, Les damnes de la terre 
(Paris: Francois Maspero, 1961). 
31 Democracy is perhaps the one sy- 
stem, though difficult to establish, 
which has the supreme virtue of 
keeping ends open while prescri- 
bing rules and instrumentalities 
and institutes for converting prin- 
ciples into interests and therefore 
amenable to negotiation. In this 
sense exchanges of meaning take 
place continuously rather than dis- 
junctively, and simultaneously in 
the public and private spheres with 
many points of mediation. 
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32 For a discussion of the deceits ac- 
companying this process see David 
E. Apter and Timothy Cheek, "In- 
troduction: The Trial" in Dai Qing, 
Wang Shizuei and 'Wild Lilies': Recti- 
fication and Purges in the Chinese 
Communist Party, 1942-1944 (Ar- 
monk, New York: M. E. Shape), pub- 
lished as Chinese Studies in History, 
Part I ,  Vol. 26, No. 2 (Winter 1992), 
pp. 7-21. 
33 See Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 
27. 
34 For a time it influenced such di- 
verse African political leaders as 
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. It rea- 
ched its discursive heights during 
the May 1968 outbreaks in France 
and in its last dying gasp has con- 
vulsed Peru in what might be its 
most tragic-comic case, that of Sen- 
der~  Luminoso in Peru. But the 
Maoism which had its greatest 
theoretical impact was that which 
evolved within the Chinese Com- 
munist Party between the years 
1936-1947 in Yan'an, not only be- 
cause it became a model liberation 
ideology but because it had behind 
it what might be called the trans- 
formation of symbolic capital into 
political power, as exemplified in 
Yan'an as a discourse community. 
35 As a radical political entity Yan'an 
lasted from 1936 to 1947 when it was 
abandoned to the Guomindang. 
36 As was suggested with reference to 
the Jacobin phase of the French 
revolution, we distinguish between 
revolutions which assert as moral 
objects radically new doctrinal 
combinations of social, economic, 
cultural and political factors from 
those which leave prevailing the 
social, economic and cultural basi- 
cally intact, transforming, as it 
were, the political mode only, as it 
was the case in the English and 
American revolutions (and in the 
end the French as well). 
37 A "project" that ended with Mao's 
demise. 
38 This differs drastically from the si- 
tuation in democracies. Since ren- 
dering inversionary discourse into 
improving objects is one of the 
unique achievements of democra- 
cy, (with its virtually infinite capa- 
city for cooptation, and its ability to 
render the heroic into the ordinary 
and convert devotional principle 
into the practical - a bargaining 
situation), it is not surprising that in- 
versionary discourse against dominant 
demwatic forms seeks to discredit 
the latter in terms of its hypocrisy. 
That is, an inversionarv d&icourse 
needs to show that political solu- 
tions that would repair flaws in 
democracy are not -only meretri- 
cious but that the flaws are built 
into the logic of democracy itself. 
That is what distinguishes mo- 
vements for reform from those fa- 
voring inversion. 
39 See Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of 
Communicative Action (Boston: Bea- 
con Press, 1984). 
40 See Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution 
and Post-Mcro R $ m  (Chicago: Uni- 
versity of Chicago Press, 1986). 
41 Foucault refuses terms like "ideo- 
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play of interests or the coalitional 
character of mediation politics. His 
concern is with inversionary dis- 
course and the communities in 
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the democratic solution of open 
ends and representative means, of 
politics as a moving equilibrium re- 
sulting from the intersecting play 
between political and economic 
market forces is irrelevant. Nor is 
he concerned with the politics of 
programmatic choices, agendas, 
parties and voting, of accountabil- 
ity and consent, i.e. of democracy 
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as a system in itself. All this is part 
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of the modern society that Niet- 
zsche rejected as mediocre, dispiri- 
ting, etc. 
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